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 In this article, I examine the ‘modal’ or ‘empathetic’ (Lyons, 1977: 677) use of the distal (or 
“non-proximal”) determiner/pronoun that:  namely, where the intended referent may have just been evoked in 
the immediately prior discourse, but where the distal pronoun that, not the ‘in-focus’ it  or the ‘activated’, 
proximal this  is used. The rationale behind the choice of this particular type of indexical seems to be that the 
speaker is distancing him/herself from the referent, not wishing to ascribe actuality to it in the way that would 
be the case if either it  or this  were used instead.  Examination of this particular value of that  leads to the 
hypothesis that the principles underlying the choice of that  as opposed to this  or it  generally are not derived 
‘objectively’, as it were, from their situational use in terms of degrees of proximity of a referent or 
demonstratum to the speaker or hearer, nor primarily in terms of attention focus.  They are, rather, social and 
cognitive, and play an important interactional role in the construction of discourse 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 In this article,1  I will be mainly examining one use of the English 
so-called “distal” demonstrative determiner/pronoun that, namely its “modal” 
or “empathetic” use, as illustrated in (1), an attested example: 
 
(1)   “The New Tate changes the whole structure of things.  The Royal Academy will  
 have to adapt to that, ” he [M. Rosenthal, the Royal Academy’s impresario] said. 
      (...) He [Rosenthal] said he sensed things were changing within the notoriously  
 conservative R.A.  “This is not the time to say what will happen to the summer show, 
 but I feel something is in the air.  I may be the Academy’s black sheep which they 
 indulge terribly, but I think the election of Philip King as president showed that  
 change2 ...” (The Guardian). 
 
Clearly, in both anaphoric references highlighted in italics in this example, the 
speaker, representing the “notoriously conservative” (in the words of the 
journalist) Royal Academy, is distancing himself (and indirectly the RA itself) 
from his intended referent (‘the New Tate and its changing the whole structure 
of things within the Art museum/gallery world’), not wishing to identify with it.   
Even though in both instances, the discourse referent retrieved via these 
occurrences is salient and recently evoked, neither the “proximal” variant this, 
                                            
1
   I would like to thank Lorenza Mondada, Walter de Mulder, Alfons Maes, Jacques Durand, and three 
anonymous ELL referees for their helpful comments on various versions of the paper presented at the 
international conference on ‘Linguistics and the English Language’ held at the University of Toulouse-Le 
Mirail, France, from 7-8 July 2000, of which the present article is a further revised version.  All responsibility 
for any remaining errors is of course mine alone. 
2
     This is in fact a determiner use of that rather than a complementizer use (as may be imagined in the absence 
of further context):  in the original article from which (1) is taken, the word change was followed by a full stop. 
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nor (in the case of the initial pronominal occurrence) the “in-focus” it, was 
used.  
 Another attested example, this time an oral one from the conference at 
which the paper on which this article is based was presented, is given as (2): 
 
(2)     [DP, introducing R. Langacker’s paper at the conference on Linguistics and the English Language, 
UTM, 8 July 2000] 
 I’d like to introduce Professor Ronald Langacker (...everyone says that!)... 
 
Again, the referent of what I call (Cornish 1999: §2.4.1, pp. 41-3) the 
“antecedent-trigger” predication (the initial clause of the fragment) is salient at 
the point where the anaphor occurs - however, the demonstrative pronoun, 
together with its containing predication as a whole, has in fact created from this 
context a generic representation of the content of that predication, conceived as 
a stereotype.  This is also an instance of discourse deixis (see §2.3 below).     
 On the basis of quite a wide-ranging corpus of this use taken from speech 
and writing, I would like to re-examine the standard view of deixis as 
essentially involving relative (geographical, and derivatively, temporal) 
objective distance from the speaker’s “zero-point” within the deictic 
framework.  This corresponds to the origo in Bühler’s (1934) account, that is, 
the time and place of utterance, and the identity of the speaker (cf. Lyons  1977: 
638).  There is now quite a wide body of work which favours this challenge 
(e.g. Cheshire  1996, Glover 2000, Maes 1996, Strauss 1993, Laury 1997, 
Himmelmann  1996, Hanks 1992, Aoyama 1995, Leonard 1995, Lapaire & 
Rotgé 1991), though not all share the same view regarding the principles to 
which the various demonstrative expressions are sensitive.   One point on which 
they do agree, however, is that the choice of one rather than another of the 
members of a closed system of indexical expressions is a discourse-creative act, 
manifesting different types of socio-discoursal relationships between speaker 
and addressee, as well as the viewpoint from which the referent is envisaged.   
Such a use is both a function of the pre-existing context and serves to change it 
at the same time.  I shall try to make precise the discourse values which the 
various members of the set this/that/it realize, and, once this is achieved, to 
show that the Columbia School’s account of the system of ‘deixis’ (involving 
relative degrees of insistent ‘pointing’ toward the intended referent) may be 
seen to flow from these more basic cognitive-discourse values. 
  
2.  DISCOURSE FUNCTIONS REALIZABLE BY THAT AND THIS 
 
2.1   Situational reference 
 
The standard and traditionally basic use of the demonstratives is to refer 
directly to entities located in or derivable from the situation of utterance.  A 
typical example is (3) below, from Cornish (1999: 26): 
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(3)   [It is dusk, and John and Mary are returning from a shopping trip.  As John is parking 
 the car, Mary exclaims:] 
 Good God!   Look at that incredibly bright light!  [Mary gestures towards a point in 
 the evening sky]  What on earth do you think it could be? 
 
 What are the distinctive features of this deictic reference via the 
demonstrative NP that incredibly bright light, in conjunction with Mary’s 
pointing gesture towards the target object?  Well, in (3) the object in question is 
available within the utterance situation, thereby assuming a certain degree of 
potential accessibility for the addressee. The speaker, adopting the “deictic 
procedure” (in Ehlich’s 1982 terms: see (4) below), assumes that her addressee 
is capable of retrieving the intended referent on the basis of the utterance 
context of which both parties are an integral part.  Ehlich’s definitions of the 
discourse-cognitive (orienting) functions of deixis and anaphora are given under 
(4):  
 
(4)  Deixis is a linguistic3  means for achieving focussing of the hearer’s attention towards 
a specific item which is part of the respective deictic space. (Ehlich, 1982: 325).   
 Anaphora is a linguistic means for having the hearer continue (sustain) a previously 
 established focus towards a specific item on which he had oriented his attention  
 earlier. (Ehlich, 1982:330). 
 
Deixis under this view may be seen as involving the use of the speech situation 
(the (deictic) ground, in Hanks’s 1992 terminology) to profile a figure (a new 
referent or a new conception of an existing referent within the discourse 
registry);  while anaphora consists in the retrieval from within a given ground of 
an already existing ‘figure’, together with its ‘ground’, the anaphoric 
predication acting to extend that ground (see Kleiber 1994, Ch. 3).  
 In example (3), then, the speaker also assumes that the addressee’s 
current attention focus is not already centred upon the intended referent at the 
time of utterance.  Her mode of reference constitutes an instruction to the 
addressee to focus his attention on the object pointed to (as in Ehlich’s 1982 
definition of the deictic procedure), entering a representation of it into his 
mental discourse model by opening a referent file containing this new topical 
referent.  This instruction is made in terms of the current utterance context by 
taking cognizance of the respective orientations of speaker and addressee, with 
the former’s index finger pointing to a particular luminous point in the sky.  
This gesture leads the latter to locate this referent within its context (the region 
of dusk sky around the luminous point in question) and to make that luminous 
point stand out from this context, simultaneously placing that context in the 
                                            
3
  I would take issue with Ehlich, however, on the purported restriction of deixis to expression via linguistic  
means (though this is no doubt a correct characterization as far as anaphora is concerned).  After all, deixis may 
well be realised via a gesture, or prosodically via a high pitch accent. 
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background in relation to the focussed object.  This “figure/ground” distinction 
is extremely important in the operation of indexical reference (cf., e.g., Hanks 
1992, Laury 1997). As many have pointed out, it is actually the gesture, not the 
linguistic expression per se, which enables the demonstratum, and hence the 
intended referent (the two are not necessarily identical) to be located.  This type 
of deictic reference corresponds to the sub-category of deixis called Deixis ad 
Oculos by Bühler (1934/1982), though of course it is not restricted to actually 
visible referents. 
 Note that this “direct pointing” use of that would be analyzed by 
proponents of the standard view of deictic reference as being a function of the 
spatial distance of the intended referent with respect to the speaker (cf. the term 
distal demonstrative commonly used to designate that).  However, it can also be 
viewed as primarily subject to socio-cognitive considerations, in serving to 
characterize the intended referent as not falling within the speaker’s discourse 
sphere (see especially Cheshire 1996, Glover 2000 on this point, as well as 
Laury 1997 in relation to the more-or-less equivalent Finnish demonstrative 
tuo).  I will be coming back to this notion repeatedly in what follows.           
 
2.2  ‘Recognitional’ or ‘reminder’ reference 
 
It is in fact that and not this which realizes the particular value in discourse 
termed the recognitional (see Himmelmann 1996) or reminder (Gundel et al. 
1993) use of demonstratives. This value involves the retrieval of some 
personally- or culturally-shared experience or situation which speaker and 
addressee are assumed to have stored in their long-term memories, and which is 
reactivated via the use of that  (usually in its determiner function).  The effect is 
to signal a sort of “complicity” between the two (or more) discourse partners.  
The attested (written, but nevertheless fairly informal) examples (5) and (6) 
illustrate: 
 
(5)  Tony Blair was said to be on the phone last week to his German oppo, Chancellor  
 Schröder, trying to talk through an upbeat final instalment of that dismal industrial 
 soap opera called Longbridge...  (The Guardian)  
  
(6)   [Sticker on rear window of car] 
 Mind that child!  He may be deaf. 
 
The reference via the demonstrative NP that dismal industrial soap opera called 
Longbridge  is a “complicitous”, tongue-in-cheek allusion to the sale of Rover 
by the German firm BMW (as if to mean “you know the one I’m talking 
about!”), which had been front-page news over the previous weeks in The 
Guardian, as well as in the press and media generally;  so the journalist could 
justifiably assume that a representation of this situation would be prominently 
stored in the reader’s episodic memory.  The subjective nature of this reference 
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is palpably evident in the presence of the adjective dismal as well as of the 
compound noun modifier soap opera within the expression used. 
 In (6), determiner that also effects a “reminder” to the addressee (the 
driver of the car assumed to be just behind the one on which the sticker is 
displayed), but this time the predicational and positional context invokes a 
stereotypical frame assumed to be buried deep in drivers’ long-term (semantic) 
memories:  such a frame consists of a representation of a situation (feared by all 
motorists) whereby a reckless child, without checking beforehand, suddenly 
rushes out into the street and into the trajectory of a vehicle, and is killed or 
maimed as a result. The use of the deictic, in conjunction with the utterance 
situation assumed by the text as a whole, serves to activate and extract this 
stereotypical representation from semantic memory and to focus attention on its 
central protagonist, the sub-category of pedestrian corresponding to a “reckless 
child” (the reference is generic).  The use of determiner that here introducing a 
superordinate noun (child) is equivalent to the exclamation “you know the type 
I mean”.  This is also the case with the use of determiner that  in (5), as we have 
seen.  
 Cognitively speaking, “reminder” references via determiner that  
function exactly like the situational reference of this form type (cf. §2.1):  in the 
latter type of use, the deictic expression together with its predicational context 
and accompanying gesture serve to construct a partially new discourse 
representation out of the representation of the utterance context which the 
addressee will have set up immediately prior to the indexical reference.  At the 
same time, it effects a “figure-ground” differentiation within it, making the 
“figure” (the demonstratum or the intended referent itself) into a salient topic 
which the subsequent discourse is expected to develop.  On the other hand, in 
the former type of reference (recognitional), the deictic does exactly the same 
cognitive job, but on the basis of a representation of a situation assumed to be 
shared by the discourse participants within their semantic or episodic memories.   
 
2.3  Discourse deixis 
 
The type of use of demonstrative expressions known as discourse deixis 
provides the basis for the existence of anaphora, according to Lyons (1977, Vol. 
2; 1979) and Bühler (1934/1982).  Contra Lakoff (1974: 345), discourse deixis 
is not (yet) anaphora, however, since its function is essentially deictic (as its 
name suggests). It involves a cognitive pointing towards the result of processing 
a predication (or a part of a predication) in surrounding discourse, and (in 
English) may be realized by both this and that, whether as determiners or 
pronouns.  The attested examples (7) and (8a), and the constructed example (9), 
illustrate ((8a) is presented in partially transcribed form: no capital letters for 
sentence-initial words, ‘-’ for a short pause, and contrastively-accented syllables 
in small capitals): 
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(7)   (...) Rose  Brocklebank said: “We were trapped, which at the time was reason to 
panic.   I shouted at the top of my voice and at that point the Fire Brigade came to our 
rescue...” (Adscene, Canterbury) 
 
(8) (a) [Interview with Jonathan Porritt, then leader of the environmental  pressure group  
 Friends of the Earth, by Nicholas Witchell, BBC Radio 5, 16 October, 1994] 
  NW:   do you think that he [Prince Charles] will become a GREEN monarch ? 
  JP:     well, yes, but I don’t think that everyone necessarily subscribes to THAT 
  NW:  -- what, that he will ever one day beCOME king? 
  JP:     yes. 
  
     (b)  ...JP:  # well, yes, but I don’t think that everyone necessarily subscribes to it. 
   
(9) Listen to this: a man went into a butcher’s shop wanting to buy a whole pig,  
 and......  (constructed example) 
 
  In (7), the demonstrative NP that point refers to the moment in the 
sequence of events narrated when the speaker shouted at the top of her voice.   
  Nicholas Witchell’s question in (8a) was about whether Prince Charles 
would be a ‘green’ (i.e. environmentally-conscious) monarch, not about 
whether in fact he would ever actually become king one day.  That is, what is 
highlighted in the context constituted by this question, given the global topic at 
issue, is Prince Charles’s ecological credentials.  The fact that he will become 
king is presupposed: the prenominal adjective GREEN was accented and 
pronounced with high pitch, while the head noun monarch was unaccented and 
carried a low level of pitch.  The interviewee, however, although he replies to 
the question posed (Well, yes..), sought to call its presupposition into question 
by using a strongly accented demonstrative pronoun (THAT) fulfilling a deictic 
function, in order to make accessible and salient an item of information which, 
in the context set up by the interpretation of the initial question, was in the 
background, not the foreground, of attention. Note the ‘metadiscursive’ 
question by the interviewer immediately following this ‘discourse-deictic’ 
reference concerning the meaning intended by the interviewee, and the latter’s 
confirmation of his interpretation.   The information-structure representation of 
this segment of discourse may be formulated as in (8c): 
 
(8) (c) Presupposition structure of the complement clause in line 1 in (8a) :    
 “that Prince Charles [will] become an X monarch” 
 
         Assertion :  “X = “environmentally-conscious”” 
 
Effect on this presupposition structure created by the interpretation of THAT within 
its predicational context :  “that Prince Charles [will] become monarch” 
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 Observe also that the ‘anaphoric procedure’, in Ehlich’s (1982) sense 
(see (4)), would certainly not have been adequate to the task in hand here.  That 
is, in (8b) #but I don’t think that everyone necessarily subscribes to it,  it  would 
necessarily be interpreted as referring to what was in focus at that particular 
point in the discourse, namely ‘that Prince Charles will be a “green” monarch’.   
This interpretation, a status marked by the crosshatch prefixed to the alternative 
initial response by Jonathan Porritt in (8a), would be somewhat incoherent here, 
in the absence of special intonation.    
 Finally, in (9), the “proximal”, accented demonstrative pronoun this, used 
“cataphorically”, is setting up a discourse node corresponding to a narrated 
event, an event which is flagged as being of some potential significance for the 
addressee, and with which the speaker is personally involved. 
 So again, discourse deixis, like its situational and recognitional or 
reminder counterparts, involves setting up a figure (the intended discourse 
referent) from within the ground in which it is embedded, and signalling that 
this figure is to be the subject of the subsequent discourse. The essential 
difference is in the nature of the ‘ground’ representation: unlike the two 
previous cases, this is not based on the utterance situation, nor on shared 
representations in episodic or semantic long-term memory, but on that of the 
immediately prior or subsequent (see example (9)) discourse. 
 
2.4  “Modal” deictic reference 
 
This brings us to the core topic of this article, the so-called “modal” or 
“empathetic” use of that.  Lyons (1977: 677) defines this as the selection of a 
form within a spatial or temporal deictic opposition in terms of relative 
“distance” from the speaker (and/or proximity to the hearer) which is not 
expected on a purely spatial or temporal basis;  rather, the opposing form is 
chosen “when the speaker is personally involved with the entity, situation or 
place to which he is referring or is identifying himself with the attitude or 
viewpoint of the addressee. (...) At this point deixis merges with modality”.  
Lyons (1982: 113-14) also suggests that in terms of the more subjective aspects 
of deixis, no sharp distinction between deixis and modality can be drawn.  This 
is particularly true, he points out (1982: 114), in the case of the cross-linguistic 
distinction between the categories of tense (which is deictically-based) and 
mood.   
 Examples (1) and (2) illustrated three instances of this type of use. The 
following attested examples provide further illustration: 
 
(10)   [Interview, BBC Radio 4] 
 ...I’m not going to the Eisteddfod this year.  Work doesn’t allow that. 
 
(11) ...“Do we want machines which are more intelligent than humans, or should we call a  
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halt to it?” he  asked. “We are still a long way from that decision but I think we 
should be realistically talking about it...To say it couldn’t happen is to put our heads 
in the sand...”   (The Guardian) 
 
(12) [Bank advertisement, “Broadsheet Nº 1”] 
 The Banks Debate 
  Did you know that there’s a proposal to nationalise the four main clearing  
 banks - Barclays, Lloyds, Midland and National Westminster? 
  That’s what the Labour Party’s National Executive Committe (NEC)  
 recommended last August in a pamphlet called “Banking and Finance”. 
  The government and the Prime Minister are against it... 
  But all the same, the proposal was passed by the 1976 Labour Party  
 Conference... 
 
(13) ...A hairpin structure could hold the point of splicing in its stem, but that would 
 necessitate ligation from one chain across to the opposite side of the helix... 
 (an attested scientific extract cited in Myers 1988: 4) 
 
(14) ...What is quite clear is the contempt Mr Major has for Mrs Thatcher’s sniping from 
 the sidelines. 
  In his first frontal onslaught on Baroness Thatcher, Mr Major says:  “In  
 retrospect, I hope that none of my successors are treated in that way”.  (The 
 Independent) 
         
 Here, we have three pronominal occurrences (in (10), (12), and (13), and 
two as a determiner (in (11) and (14)).  In all cases, there is evidence of a modal 
distancing on the speaker’s or writer’s part in regard to the intended referent, 
within the predications containing these occurrences. In (10), this is achieved 
via the denial of the actuality of the event denoted in the initial sentence;  in 
(11), through the assertion of the extended time-span between the time of 
utterance and the possible event of a decision being taken which would stop the 
machines referred to in the initial question becoming more intelligent than 
humans. Interestingly, there is a change of stance on the writer’s part in the 
immediately following clause, when he asserts the need for us to start thinking 
now about the problem just evoked.  He refers back to this problem with the 
modally-neutral pronoun it, and no longer with that, a factor which, I would 
argue, signals a shift in the point of view hitherto established.     
 In (12), the knowledge that the “Broadsheet” in question was produced 
by a banking consortium with the express aim of alerting the public to the risk 
(as it saw it) of the then Labour government implementing the Labour Party’s 
NEC proposal to nationalize the four main UK clearing banks, together with the 
presentation of this information in the form of a question in the initial sentence,  
provides substantial motivation for interpreting the referent of that in the second 
sentence as a possible event which the authors do not want to see translated into 
reality.    
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 In (13), as Myers (1988) points out, the pronoun that is appropriate since 
the propositional content it points to (“the fact that a hairpin structure could 
hold the point of splicing in its stem”), as well as the pronoun’s immediate 
predicational context (...would necessitate ligation...), are both heavily 
qualified. Hence the writer here is clearly distancing himself from the 
proposition evoked, which is conceived as a hypothetical situation.  As in all the 
instances of demonstrative deixis we have seen so far, there is an implication of 
contrast, a property which is indeed a distinctive feature of demonstratives 
generally. 
 Finally, in (14), the context of the demonstrative determiner also clearly 
shows the negative light in which the speaker casts the referent - which is raised 
to a generic concept via the head noun way, as well as by the choice of the 
generalizing demonstrative that. As in all of these instances, there is contextual, 
corroborating evidence here of the modally distancing value of the distal 
demonstrative that. 
  The common thread running through these ‘modal’ uses, then, seems to 
be the fact that the speaker is not wishing to associate him/herself or identify 
with the referent, or with a group or individual holding a particular position in a 
debate. This is particularly true in examples (11), (12), (13) (where the 
possibility evoked of the hairpin structure holding the point of splicing in its 
stem could well constitute a position held by a fellow scientist within a debate 
on this issue) and (14). That is, the speaker is tacitly instructing the addressee to 
place the referent outside his/her (i.e the speaker’s) discourse-cognitive sphere, 
in terms of a particular type of interaction both with the addressee or reader, and 
with the group or individual whose position is rejected. The addressee or reader 
in these examples is tacitly appealed to as a witness, or as a potential ally in the 
speaker/writer’s argumentative stance.  Strauss (1993) and others (e.g. Cheshire 
1996, Laury 1997, Glover 2000) suggest that what she calls “non-phoric” that  
functions interactively to create a sort of solidarity between the discourse 
participants, establishing common ground.4   Cheshire (1996: 372) notes that, in 
her corpus of conversational utterances, “the proximal-distal dimension [in 
connection with the choice of that versus this and vice versa] is rarely relevant”, 
“the spatial dimension of their meaning [being] virtually always neutralised”.5  
The existence of a relation of solidarity between the participants may well be 
the case in (11), (13) (an extract from a scientific text where the need to 
establish “publicly verifiable” facts is paramount), and (14) - but not 
self-evidently in (10) or (12).  My feeling is that this interpretative effect is a 
type of inference which may be drawn from the use of that in context, rather 
                                            
4
   See also Maes (1996), who invokes the notion of other [i.e. different] referential domain, ([ORD]), as 
distinct from the default deictic domain constituted by the current speaker’s construction of discourse (the DRD, 
or deictic  reference domain). 
5
  See also the conclusion reached by Glover (2000: 925) on the basis of a corpus of urban planning negotiation 
interactions. 
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than it being a basic motivating principle determining its use. Maes’s 
characterization, as we shall see later on, is more general, and accounts for all 
these examples. 
 Given that there is a common thread running through the uses of that 
illustrated so far, we may legitimately regard this “modal” use of that as basic, 
the corresponding use of this being a function of the speaker’s wish to identify 
with the referent, placing it within his/her discourse-cognitive sphere.  Strauss 
(1993) gives a number of spontaneous spoken extracts which show the 
heightened emotivity and subjectivity of the use of this  in referring to objects, 
propositions or situations in which the speaker is closely involved personally.  
See also in this regard the typical “focussing” new-topic-introducing use of this 
as illustrated in (9), as well as the use of “indefinite-this” in familiar, spoken 
English to introduce a referent which the speaker feels is of some importance, 
for example in a narrative, and which is thereby tagged as likely to persist for at 
least several predications in the ensuing discourse. (15) is an attested example 
from Schiffrin (1994:112): 
 
(15)    Because there’s this guy Louie Gelman, he went to a BIG specialist, and the  
 guy...analyzed it WRONG. 
 
 The context of the fragment in (15) is a conversation about what people 
do before they go to a doctor: the speaker in (15), in response to the  suggestion 
of this topic (by Schiffrin herself), chose to tell a story about an  acquaintance 
of his, Louie Gelman. Note the use of the existential, presentational 
construction there’s + indefinite NP, showing that the determiner this, in spite 
of its morphology, is treated in this usage as indefinite, introducing a 
discourse-new referent, though at the same time, it establishes a specific 
discourse entity.  Note also the left-detached context in which this 
demonstrative NP occurs, signalling a change of thematic or discourse unit.  
This function of this may be seen as close in value to the discourse-deictic 
function illustrated by the ‘cataphoric’ use of the pronoun this  seen in example 
(9) above. 
 It is tempting to consider the other three major uses of the demonstratives 
(determiner and pronoun) as being subject to the same socio-discoursal 
constraints as is clearly the case with the modal, subjective use. Under this 
view, the geographical criterion invoked by standard accounts of deixis for the 
situational use can be seen as an epiphenomenon of the socio-discoursal values 
which the modal use manifests. 
 
3.  OTHER ‘NON-SPATIAL’ ACCOUNTS OF DEMONSTRATIVES  
 
Let’s look now at various similar accounts of the demonstrative 
determiners/pronouns, which also reject the “distance” parameter as providing 
            11 
the basis for the functioning of such pairs (this/that, now/then, here/there).  I 
begin with Strauss’s (1993) study of demonstratives in a range of familiar, 
spoken registers within the Columbia School of Linguistics (see also Aoyama’s  
1995 study of the Japanese demonstratives, in comparison with that of Kuroda 
1985, and Leonard’s 1995 account of the Swahili ones within this framework). 
 
3.1  Strauss (1993)  
 
Strauss contains a critique of the standard “static” account of deictically used 
demonstratives in terms of the relative geographical location of their referents 
in relation to the speaker: “near the speaker = this/this N” and “far from the 
speaker = that/that N”. She gives naturally-occurring spoken examples where 
that, for instance, is used by a speaker to refer to a physical entity which he 
describes via a gesture representing its shape (e.g. 1993: 414, where the 
speaker, Curt, mimics the shape of a car component), and where it is used 
anaphorically to refer back to something that has just been evoked.  Examples 
of the latter in the present paper would be the first occurrence of that in 
example (1), and those in examples (9), (10), (11), (12) and (13).  These are all 
examples of “modal” deixis.  See also Maes’s (1996) corpora of written data, 
which show that the equivalent Dutch pair of demonstrative determiners deze  
and die  do not pattern in terms of “anaphoric” distance in the way predicted by 
the “locality” account. For the exophoric use of demonstrative pronouns, 
Janssen (1995) gives a very telling pair, from a medical dialogue: 
 
(16)  a.   Doctor: Is this where it hurts? 
     Doet het zeer op deze plek? 
 
         b.  Patient:  Yes, that is where it hurts. 
     Ja, op die plek. 
 
If the locality account of demonstrative use were strictly applied, we would 
expect the point indicated by the patient to be referred to via this, not that, since 
the spot in question is part of his own body, and so cannot be any closer to him. 
  It is true that proponents of the 
“relative-geographical-distance-of-referent-from-speaker” account of 
demonstratives would say that there is a “metaphorical” kind of distance 
involved here between the intended referent and the speaker, viewed in 
psychological terms.  However, this analysis is not always possible for every 
occurrence of that in contrast to this,  and in any case, it would completely fail 
to capture the interactional dimension which forms an integral aspect of the use 
of the demonstratives, according to Strauss, Cheshire and many others.  
Moreover, as Strauss points out (1993: 405), the results of an analysis of a 
41,500 word database from a range of spoken genres (of which Strauss presents 
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a representative sample in her article) show that occurrences of this accounted 
for only 15% of the total number of occurrences of the three indexical forms 
this, that and it (in their plural as well as singular forms), while instances of that 
were twice as frequent (see her Table, 1, 1993: 406). As she observes, this 
patterning in natural spoken discourse is the exact opposite of what would be 
expected on the basis of the “distance” parameter. It also provides clear 
evidence that that is the unmarked member of the this/that  opposition.   
 Strauss proposes a systemic analysis in terms of the so-called “Focus” 
system within the Columbia School of Linguistics (in fact, most CS linguists 
call this “Deixis”, reserving “Focus” for a slightly different phenomenon). That 
is, the semantic substance FOCUS has to do with the degree of attention which 
the speaker tacitly instructs the addressee to pay to the intended referent. The 
form this is then said to signal that the addressee needs to accord a HIGH degree 
of focus to the referent at issue, since the referent is an important one within the 
discourse under construction:  its content is “new” to the discourse at the point 
of use.  The form that is said to signal the need for a MEDIUM degree of focus on 
the intended referent, the referent being of intermediate importance for the 
discourse and constituting already-shared information for the addressee.  
Finally, it (which is not centrally examined in the article under discussion) is 
said to signal the need for only a LOW degree of focus, its referent being 
“unimportant” for the discourse and, as in the case of the use of that, 
representing already-shared information. This system is displayed in Figure 1 
below (Strauss 1993: 404): 
 
(17)  Form MEANING SIGNAL  Hearer   Referent 
 
degree  This HIGH FOCUS new information important 
of attention     (not shared) 
to pay to 
the referent That MEDIUM FOCUS  
 
 
  It LOW FOCUS  shared information unimportant 
 
  Fig. 1.  Strauss’s Schema of focus for demonstrative reference        
 
The information listed under the “Hearer” and “Referent” columns is intended 
to be taken as a function of the speaker’s assessment, not in “absolute” terms.   
Strauss, then, characterizes what can be seen as the marked member of the 
tripartite system of Focus (this) as serving to “call a particular referent into the 
consciousness of the hearer. It is the most powerful of the forms, since it can 
convey meaning for brand new and previously unknown information.” (1993: 
407).    
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 The values which each demonstrative form-type encodes are conceived 
by Strauss as constituting “speaker stance”, in cognitive-interactional terms, 
relative not only to the intended referent, but to the addressee and to what is 
currently being done in terms of the creation of discourse. She gives examples 
(e.g. 1993: 410-11) where that is used in order to give a resumptive summary of 
the preceding discourse unit, thereby signalling the end of the current turn (e.g. 
..That’s exactly the point.), and where this is used both to forcefully underline 
the speaker’s point, and to indicate that the turn is still ongoing (e.g. ...This is 
the whole point. For example now...). See also Lapaire & Rotgé’s (1991: §2) 
distinction in terms of the “psycho-grammatical” notions “non-closure” for this  
and “closure” for that. 
 Two immediate counterexamples to Strauss’s explanatory axioms would 
be examples (3) and (6) from the present paper, where in both cases 
(particularly in (6)), the speaker is directing the addressee’s attention by means 
not of this, but of that, to a referent which is both new (though admittedly 
“shared” - and hence “identifiable” - in terms of a stereotypical frame in the 
case of (6)) and important for the subsequent discourse. The Columbia School 
notion of a hierarchy of attention-directing form-types seems a little too strong 
in such cases. Rather than positing a scale of ATTENTION FOCUS in terms of 
strength of insistent pointing towards the intended referent, I think it is 
preferable to place greater theoretical weight on the notions of “speaker’s strong 
subjective involvement” in the case of this, and “speaker’s solidarity and 
co-alignment with the addressee” in the case of that. This is precisely the kind 
of account which Laury (1997) gives for the Finnish demonstratives tämä ‘this’, 
tuo ‘that’, and se ‘it/that/the’.  The relative positions on the FOCUS continuum 
postulated by Strauss can then be seen to flow from these more basic systemic 
values. 
 
3.2    Laury (1997) and  Östman (1995) on the Finnish demonstratives 
 
 Laury (1997: 59) defines the “instructions for use” of the Finnish 
demonstratives as follows:  tämä ‘this’ carries with it the tacit instruction to the 
addressee to place its referent “within [the speaker’s] current sphere”. This 
sphere may or may not also include the addressee.  The speaker’s current sphere 
is at the same time partially defined by the occurrence of tämä.  Tuo ‘that’, on 
the other hand, conveys the tacit instruction to place the intended referent 
outside the speaker’s current sphere, thereby also defining that sphere.  Finally, 
the use of se ‘the’/‘it’/‘that’ has the speaker placing the intended referent within 
the addressee’s sphere. Following Hanks’s (1992) proposal for the analysis of 
demonstratives, Laury (ibid: 60) suggests that the Finnish demonstratives are 
best conceived as encoding both “characterizing” features, describing the given 
demonstrative’s referent (in the case of the three non-locative demonstrative 
form-types mentioned above, this would be “reference point”, i.e. ‘the one’), 
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and “relational” features, which specify the type of relationship which the 
demonstrative establishes between its referent and the indexical ground.  In this 
connection, tämä  and se are said to be “inclusive”, in that they both include the 
referent in (respectively) the speaker’s or the addressee’s current sphere, 
whereas tuo is claimed to be “exclusive” since it signals that the referent is 
excluded from the speaker’s and the addressee’s current sphere. The indexical 
ground is the speaker (and optionally also the addressee) for tämä  and tuo, and 
the addressee for se.   
 Östman (1995) develops a very similar analysis of the Finnish 
demonstratives. His claim that what he calls “Affective” deixis is in fact 
cognitively basic with respect to the situational, discourse-deictic and 
recognitional uses, is in fact very close to my own in this article. However, he 
doesn’t develop this bold claim or give arguments for it to any extent. On this 
view, s(i)e  is the neutral term in the triplet of Finnish indexical forms, tää... is 
the speaker-oriented one, and tuo is non-speaker oriented (1995: 265).  
According to Östman,  
 
The tää- term is used for referents the speaker has empathy with, or is involved with.  
Thus, as a consequence, it will also be used for things proximal to the speaker. The 
tuo-term is used for cases where the speaker does not have empathy with the referent, 
or where s/he even has antipathy towards the referent - thus, as a consequence it is 
used of distal things, and of referents that are new, because they are unknown.  The 
sie-term, finally, is basically used when empathy, involvement, and affect is not at 
issue in the communicative situation. 
    
Three examples involving Affective deixis (negative in (18), positive in (19), 
and neutral in (20)) follow: 
 
(18)  Tuo Väyrynen on sitten maailman suurin älykääpiö   (Östman’s (24)) 
         ‘That [TUO] Väyrynen is really the world’s biggest pighead.’ 
 
(19)  Tä(m)ä Fillmore on sitten fiksu tyyppi.  (Östman’s (25)) 
         ‘This [TAA] Fillmore is a really sharp guy.’ 
 
(20)   No, se Donner on nyt sellainen kun se aina on ollut.   (Östman’s (26)) 
         ‘Well, that [SIE] Donner is the way he’s always been.’ 
 
According to Östman (1995: 270), interactively, the use of s(i)e (as in (20)) 
presupposes an already-shared perspective on the referent on the part of speaker 
and addressee, whereas tää... (as in (19)) has the effect of “the speaker ‘placing’ 
the addressee next to him/her and imposing his/her perspective on the addressee 
in order for both of them eventually to end up sharing the speaker’s 
perspective”.  In cognitive-affective terms, given that such a referent is deemed 
important enough for the speaker to bring the addressee in close to him/her, the 
former “(possibly inadvertently) displays a potentially positive attitude to this 
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referent”.   In the case of the use of tuo as in (18), in Laury’s (1997) terms, the 
speaker is placing the referent outside of his/her current sphere, aligning 
him/herself with the addressee in doing so. At the same time, according to 
Östman (1995: 270), “the speaker’s negative attitude towards the referent under 
discussion is clearly displayed”.            
  
3.3   Maes (1996) 
 
 Maes (1996) offers a very interesting proposal for accounting for the 
Dutch (and by implication English and other languages) demonstrative 
determiners. His approach is part semantic, part pragmatic, and is based on a 
detailed study of several corpora of written texts, from a variety of genres. I will 
concentrate on the pragmatic dimension of his proposal, which works for all the 
data in the present corpus. Basically, Maes is saying that all demonstratives 
presuppose the existence of their referent in some referential domain, of which 
there are basically two. The first is the utterance-level domain of the 
speaker/writer who is producing an act of discourse in the default deictic 
context of the here and now. Maes calls this the deictic reference domain 
(DRD).  Secondly, there are a variety of other reference domains (ORD) which 
are defined negatively with respect to the basic DRD, where the speaker is 
situated (subjectively as well as in terms of the hic et nunc of the speech 
production).  The “proximal” form deze (‘this’) is associated with the DRD, 
while the “distal” form die (‘that’) operates within the ORD. The DRD is 
constituted by the coordination points outlined by Bühler (1982: 11) in his 
deictic field: ‘here’ (position of speaker), ‘now’ (time of utterance), ‘I’ (identity 
of current speaker). To these, Maes adds the coordination point represented by 
the text in the written mode (but this is also needed in the spoken mode). As far 
as ORDs are concerned, these are determined as a function of the three 
coordination points ‘place’, ‘time’ and ‘reader/addressee’, leaving the speaker 
or writer out of perspective.  Each demonstrative determiner type may function 
in terms of one or more of the relevant coordination points in each domain of 
reference. There are two types of subvalues expressible within each domain: 
so-called ‘actor-oriented’, pragmatic values: [DRDs/w] for orientation to 
speaker/writer, and [ORDa/r] for orientation to the addressee or reader. With 
[DRDs/w] the relationship between speaker/writer and addressee/reader is 
fundamentally unequal, the former imposing their perspective on the latter, 
while with [ORDa/r], the relationship is mutual, equal.  Further non-participant 
values are those involving the material coordinate points (‘p’ for place of 
utterance, ‘t’ for time of utterance, and ‘d’ for the discourse itself): [DRDp], 
[DRDt], [DRDd], on the one hand, and [ORDp], [ORDt], on the other.  A gap is 
of course [ORDd], since as we have seen, discourse-deixis may well be realised 
via that forms. The specific, context-dependent interpretations of given 
occurrences of the demonstratives are then claimed to be a function of 
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inferences drawn in order to flesh out the bare interpretative framework 
provided by these domains and the instantiation of their coordination points.  
Two prototypical examples illustrating each type of domain are the following 
examples from Maes’s work: 
 
(21)     [“self-reference”]  Er zijn dit jaar [DRDt] in dit land [DRDp] vierhonderdtwintig  
 moorden gepleegd.   (Maes 1996: ex. (19), p. 140) 
 ‘This year, four hundred and twenty murders have been committed in this country’ 
 
(22)     [“diegetic”6  narrative]  Er was eens een prinsi .  {Die/?Deze } prinsi  [ORDt/p] had een 
 kasteel.  (Maes 1996: ex. (20), p. 140) 
 ‘Once upon a time there was a prince.  {That/This} prince had a castle.’ 
 
 As Maes points out (1996: 141), the deze NPs in (21) (the form dit is the 
neuter variant) associate their referents with the coordinate points ‘time’ and 
‘place’ of the deictic referential domain of the discourse.  We can also note the 
confirming presence of the present-perfect tense-aspect in both versions of this 
utterance, placing emphasis on the present relevance of the past-time events 
evoked.   Replacing the deze/this NPs here with die/that NPs would destroy this 
association (and would presumably result in an incoherent viewpoint on the 
events involved, if the present-perfect tense-aspect is retained). In (22), 
however, the die/that NP associates the referent with the coordination points 
‘time’ and ‘place’ of a non-deictic, or “other” referential domain [ORD] which 
is evoked by the content of the text itself - the story being told. Note here the 
co-presence of the simple definite past tense, which corroborates the non-deictic 
(in the strict sense) value of the die/that NP.7  Maes suggests that the deze/this 
NP variant would be unacceptable or highly marked in this context,8  but in fact 
my feeling as regards the English forms is that this NP is not only acceptable, 
but preferable to the that NP counterpart which Maes suggests is the default 
choice here in Dutch. One can indeed paraphrase the discourse value of the 
deze/this NP variant here as ‘The prince about whom I’m telling you here and 
now’.  
 But the [ORDt/p] association isn’t restricted to diegetic story-telling 
discourse, since in other types of discourse, where for example the real world is 
evoked, die/that NPs with the value [ORDt/p] often suggest factuality.  
Examples involving English that from the present study would be (8), where the 
use of contrastively-accented THAT in its predicational context assumes that for 
the great majority of people in Britain at the time, it was an established fact that 
Prince Charles would not in fact become king one day. Similar considerations 
hold for the occurrences of pronoun that in (10), (12) and (13), and for that 
                                            
6
    That is, “having to do with the narrated content of a story of some kind” (Genette, 1972 : 72). 
7
   See Lapaire & Rotgé (1991: 65-6) for further elaboration of this correlation between the use of one or other 
of the two demonstrative form types at issue, and the choice of a given tense type.  
8
    An anonymous ELL reader agreed with Maes’s judgement here for Dutch. 
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incredibly bright light in (3), and that decision in (11). In the case of the 
occurrence of this  in (9), and of this guy Louie Gelman in (15), we are clearly 
firmly within the primary deictic domain of the speaker managing his discourse 
on the spot. The speaker’s personal involvement with his reference is well in 
evidence in both these cases. Note also the imperative form of the verb of which 
the pronoun this is an argument in (9), and the present tense in the left-detached 
presentational construction in (15), with the switch to the definite past when the 
narrative proper begins in the following, main conjoined clauses.     
 Interestingly, if we look again at example (7), which I presented as an 
instance of discourse-deixis, it is clear that the “speaker-distancing” form that   
rather than the “speaker-identificational” form this was chosen because the 
context of this use is that of indirect, not direct, speech.  So even though the 
reference is being made to something which has just been mentioned, since the 
speaker in question is (re-)telling an event in which she was involved, she is 
placing herself vicariously in that situation but her origo is located within the 
(re-)telling, the narration, not in the original speech situation narrated - hence 
the use of that  rather than this. The referential context is therefore of type 
[ORDt/p/d]. This could have been used here, but characteristically with a 
different value: it would have had the effect of switching the origo and hence 
the indexical ground to the original speech event. 
          Concerning the “relational” uses, Maes noted a clear patterning in the 
frequency of occurrence in different types of written texts in his corpora: 
preponderantly, deze/this NPs occurred in texts which can be independently 
characterized as “unequal” in terms of the writer-reader relationship (expository 
texts, leaflets and brochures explaining certain official rules or regulations or 
instructing the reader to do certain things), while die/that NPs were most 
common in book or TV programme reviews, autobiography extracts and 
personal comments on actual events. Most of these texts were narrative and 
factual in orientation, but also fairly informal in tone, suggesting an equal, 
mutual relationship between writer and reader. Hence we can see that this vs. 
that patterning in natural discourse is determined both by global features of the 
discourse as a whole, as well as by local factors having to do with the 
speaker/writer’s specific discourse-interactional intention in producing a 




 Let’s now take stock. The principles underlying the “basic” use of the 
English demonstratives (and possibly also those of other languages as well) do 
not correspond to their “situational” use in terms of the current utterance 
situation where the intended referent is physically present and is indicated by 
means of forms specifically encoding the relative spatial distance of that 
referent in relation to the speaker, the addressee, or both. Instead, they 
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correspond to an “empathetic” or “modal” use, involving the expression of the 
speaker’s attitude towards the referent, as well as of a particular discourse 
stance with respect to the addressee. It is in this particular use (considered 
“derived” and “secondary”, even marginal, by proponents of the standard 
account of the use of the demonstratives) that the cognitive-interactional 
underpinning of these form-types is most evident.    
 In using this (in its plural as well as singular form, and whether occurring 
as a determiner or as a pronoun), the speaker is establishing the referent 
cognitively within his/her discourse sphere, thereby tacitly associating and 
involving him/herself with it. The values manifested through the other types of 
use we have seen earlier flow from this condition: designata physically present 
within the situation of utterance which are relatively close to the speaker’s 
location;  referents derived co-textually from a highly topical text segment just 
produced, or from one which is just about to be produced (see example (9)); 
those introduced forcefully into a spoken narrative and which are signalled as 
about to assume some importance in the subsequent discourse (example (15)); 
and uses where the speaker is marking his/her intention to continue a current 
turn in a conversation.   
 In using determiner/pronoun that, whether singular or plural, on the other 
hand, the speaker is signalling that the intended referent is not cognitively or 
subjectively within his/her discourse sphere, though this use may well indicate 
that s/he is aligning her/himself with the addressee. From this condition flow 
the other types of use of this form:  the fact that its designata physically present 
within the situation of utterance are relatively far from the speaker’s location 
(and possibly also from the addressee’s) (see example (3)); that they are 
anchored within a shared experience represented in long-term memory (see 
examples (5) and (6)); that they are derived co-textually from within a text 
segment which is not topical (i.e. which is outside the current threshold of 
attention of the discourse participants) (see examples (7)-(8a)); or that they 
signal the end of the current turn in a conversation or of a discourse segment 
more generally.    
 Looking back at the Columbia School account of the three-way 
distinction between this, that and it, which was briefly mentioned in the 
discussion of Strauss’s (1993) account of these forms in §3.1 (see (17)), we can 
now say that the scale of attention-focussing signalled by each of these forms 
can be seen as deriving from their individual cognitive-interactive values.  If the 
use of this signals that the speaker is placing the referent within his/her 
subjective discourse sphere, then this referent is given the status of an entity for 
which the speaker is claiming responsibility, in discourse terms. Thus the 
“greater insistence” or “urging” on the speaker’s part that the addressee attend 
to the referent may be predicted.  On the other hand, if the use of that signals 
that the speaker is placing the referent outside of his/her subjective discourse 
sphere, and at the same time aligns him/herself with the addressee in doing so 
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(cf. Maes’s [ORDa/r]), then it is predicted that the referent, though pointed at 
demonstratively, belongs (in a discourse sense) “equally” to the 
addressee/reader and to the speaker/writer, and therefore the addressee needs to 
expend somewhat less cognitive effort on retrieving it. Note that these 
differences do not necessarily also imply a difference in degree of importance 
of the referent concerned to the discourse at hand, contrary to what Strauss 
(1993) claims. 
 Finally, unstressed it (which is in fact unstressable, unlike the two 
demonstrative members of the system), being in addition non-demonstrative in 
form, clearly has the lowest degree of attention-directing potential of the three 
forms.  Like Finnish s(i)e, it conveys the basic presupposition that the attention 
of the discourse partners is already focussed on the intended referent (which is 
topical to a degree), where the referent constitutes shared information. Unlike 
Finnish s(i)e, however, English it conveys no indication that the referent is 
located within the addressee’s discourse sphere. Hence it is predicted that, of 
the three indexical forms under discussion, the pronoun it will convey the 
lowest degree of insistent pointing towards the intended referent, since its 
location within the current discourse segment is assumed already to be in focus.                  
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